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SUMMARY 
Ludwig von Mises introduced the concept of marginal utility into Austrian economics. He presented what he described 
as a complete theory of the value of money on the basis of the subjective theory of value and its peculiar doctrine of 
marginal utility. It is shown here that Mises’ theory of value is unclear for at least three reasons. Mises states that his 
theory of money is based on Menger’s theory of value, while in fact his theory refers to Jevons’ rather than to Menger’s. 
Secondly, the essence of Mises’ theory contradicts his earlier assumption on the immeasurability of the use value of 
money. Thirdly, Mises’ concept of continuity in the objective exchange value of money is not grounded in the subjective 
theory of value. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Ludwig von Mises belongs to the so-called Austrian 
school of economics. His scientific achievements are 
impressive and go beyond the accomplishments of that 
school. Although Mises dealt with the general theory of 
economics, the central focus of his interest was always 
money. Mises proved that resource allocations begin and 
end in the exchange of commodities – consequently all 
economic issues are related to the theory of money. 
The Theory of Money and Credit (1912) is more than 
100 years old, but it nonetheless contains theses that call 
into question the contemporary approach to money. Mises’ 
theory of money value derives from that of Carl Menger, a 
founder of the Vienna school of economics. Although 
Mises’ theory is rooted in Menger’s, the author departs to 
a certain extent from its core. Mises introduced, among 
other things, the concept of the objective exchange value 
of money, and attributed to it a special significance in the 
process of money valuation. He showed that the subjective 
value of money is derived from the objective exchange 
value. ‘While the utility of other goods depends on (…) 
conditions that do not belong to the category of economics 
at all but are partly of a technological and partly a 
psychological nature, the subjective value of money is 
conditioned by its objective exchange value, that is, by a 
characteristic that falls within the scope of economics’ 
(Mises 1981, p. 118). 
The primary goal of this article is to determine whether 
Mises remains a successor to the Mengerian subjective 
theory of value, or whether his theory of money value 
relies rather on Jevons’ scientific rigor. 
ON THE (IM)MEASURABILITY OF 
THE SUBJECTIVE VALUE OF MONEY 
A central element in Mises’ theory of money value 
(1912) is the concept of objective exchange value. 
Subjective valuation of money is based on the assumption 
that money has a certain objective exchange value, i.e. the 
possibility of obtaining a certain quantity of other 
economic goods in exchange for a given quantity of 
money. ‘If we wish to estimate the significance that a given 
sum of money has (...) we can do this only on the 
assumption that money possesses a given objective 
exchange value’ (Mises 1981, p. 119). ‘Both the subjective 
use value of money and its subjective exchange value are 
derived from its objective exchange value’ (Mises 1981, p. 
118). 
This approach to the value of money may be viewed in 
certain respects as inconsistent with Menger’s subjective 
theory of value. Let us start from the beginning, however, 
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namely by explaining the essence of the theory of 
commodity valuation and its reference to the medium of 
exchange. 
In the second chapter of his book Theory of Money and 
Credit (1912) Mises argues that ‘the notion of money as a 
measure of value is fallacious’ (Mises 1981, p. 51). This 
conflicts with the fundamentals of Menger’s theory of 
value. ‘Every economic activity presupposes a comparison 
of values’ (Mises 1981, p. 51). The process of valuing 
means ordering commodities according to their 
importance to each individual. Each person draws up a list 
of comparative values for a given point of time (Mises 
1981, p. 52). The need for such a comparison is due to the 
circumstance that the process of valuation itself leads 
eventually to the exchange of commodities. Instead of 
stating that ‘this commodity is worth so much’ we can only 
say that ‘the value of this commodity is greater than the 
value of that’. ‘The subjective use value of a commodity is 
immeasurable. It is impracticable to ascribe a quantity (of 
values) to it’ (Mises 1981, p. 58). 
In Theory of Money…  Mises refers to Carl Menger’s 
contributions to the general theory of value. According to 
Menger, the notion of value belongs to the category of 
human judgment. A value is the importance we assign to a 
good because we are aware that the satisfaction of a need 
depends on command over the good in question1. The 
value that we attribute to a good derives from the 
importance of the need it satisfies2. It is the result of a 
transfer of the importance of the need onto the good that 
satisfies that need3. The magnitude of the value depends 
on the relative rank of the need satisfied by the good and 
on the quantity of good being available to a person4. The 
nature of value is subjective. It directs human economic 
choices, i.e. commodity exchange. Carl Menger showed 
that the origin of money as a medium of exchange refers 
to money as an economic good. Each exchange transaction 
is preceded by an act of valuation. When individuals 
exchange commodities, they reveal their individual value 
scales. If commodity a is exchanged for commodity b it is 
because the individuals involved assign opposite values to 
them. If commodity a is a loaf of bread, and commodity b 
is half a dozen eggs, then the first party to the transaction 
values the half-dozen eggs ‘higher’ than the loaf of bread, 
while the other values the loaf of bread higher than the 
half-dozen eggs. In other words, an individual will 
exchange a good or certain quantity of it as long as the 
goods acquired are more valuable than the goods given up. 
The exchange ratio is a result of their different importance 
to the individuals concerned. 
Although Mises argued that the subjective estimates of 
individuals are the basis for the economic valuation of 
money, just as for other goods (Mises 1981, p. 117), he 
unexpectedly introduced into the theory of money value a 
concept of marginal utility, based on its objective 
exchange value. Mises assumed that a valuation of money 
is possible only on the assumption that money has a certain 
objective exchange value (Mises 1981, p. 130). ‘Since 
there is no direct connection between money as such and 
any human want, an individual can obtain an idea of its 
utility and consequently of its value only by assuming a 
definite purchasing power’ (Mises 1981, p. 130). As we 
can see, Mises does not apply universal rules governing the 
value of goods to the value of money. On the contrary, he 
states that the theory of money must take account of the 
fundamental difference between the principles that govern 
the value of money and those that govern the value of 
commodities. ‘We need to undertake a different approach 
in the theoretical approach to the value of money and other 
commodities’ (Mises 1981, p. 122). ‘It is not the task of 
economics (...) to explain why corn is useful to man and 
valued by him. But it is the task of economics alone to 
explain the utility of money’ (Mises 1981, p. 119). This 
line of argument leads Mises to conclusions that contradict 
earlier theses, firstly on the immeasurability of the 
subjective value of money, and secondly on the nature of 
value as a category of human judgement. In stating a link 
between the objective exchange value of money and 
subjective valuations of the medium of exchange, Mises 
introduced the concept of marginal utility as a measure of 
value. ‘The subjective use value of money must be 
measured by the marginal utility of the goods for which 
the money can be exchanged’ (Mises 1981, p. 130). All of 
this shows that Ludwig von Mises did indeed depart from 
the Mengerian concept of the process of valuation. This 
would appear to have had many far-reaching 
consequences. 
 
 
 
1  (...) Es ist somit der Werth die Bedeutung, welche concrete Güter oder Güterquantitäten für uns dadurch erlangen, dass wer in der Befriedigung 
unserer Bedürfnisse von der Verfugung über dieselben abhängig zu sein bewusst sind (Menger 1871/2010, p. 78). 
2  Der Güterwerth ist in der Beziehung der Güter zu unseren Bedürfnissen begründet, nicht in den Gütern selbst (Menger 1871/2010, p. 85). 
3  Die Bedeutung, welche die Güter für uns haben, und welche wir Werth nennen, ist lediglich eine übertragene. Ursprünglich habe nur die 
Bedürfnisbefriedigungen für uns eine Bedeutung, (...), wir übertragen aber in logischer Consequenz diese Bedeutung auf jene Güter, von deren 
Verfügung wir in der Befriedigung dieser Bedürfnisse abhängig zu sein uns bewusst sind (Menger 1871/2010, p. 107). 
4  Die Grösse der Bedeutung, welche die verschiedenen concreten Bedürfnisbefriedigungen (die einzelnen Acte derselben, welche eben durch concrete 
Güter herbeigeführt werden können) für uns haben ist eine ungleiche und das Mass derselben liegt in dem Grade ihrer Wichtigkeit für die 
Aufrechterhaltung unseres Lebens und unserer Wohlfahrt. (...) Die Grösse der auf die Güter übertragenen Bedeutung unserer 
Bedürfnisbefriedigungen, das ist die Grösse des Werthes, ist somit gleichfalls eine verschiedene (...) (Menger 1871/2010, p. 107). 
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UTILITY AS A MEASURE OF 
MONEY VALUE 
In Theory of Money and Credit (1912) Mises argued 
that ‘the revolution in economics since 1870 had not 
provided a satisfactory solution to the theory of value 
problem’ (Mises 1981, p. 137). Although Menger, as 
Mises argues, had initiated a deeper understanding of the 
nature and value of money, nobody had yet succeeded in 
solving ‘the fundamental problem of the value of money’. 
Mises assumed that the essence of money’s utility 
derives from its objective exchange value. If an individual 
values money, he needs to assume that it has some 
purchasing power. The value of money is derived from the 
objective factor, namely money’s purchasing power. We 
need to search for, as Mises writes, ‘objective determinants 
of its subjective value’ (Mises 1981, p. 119). Any 
investigation of subjective value demands prior 
investigation of this objective exchange value. ‘There is no 
subjective value of money without objective exchange 
value’ (Mises 1981, p. 119). ‘The theory of the value of 
money leads us back through subjective exchange value to 
objective exchange value’ (Mises 1981, p. 122). How does 
Mises eventually trace the objective determinants of the 
subjective exchange value of money? Mises assumes that 
the objective exchange value of money contains a 
historically continuous component. ‘The past value of 
money is taken over by the present and transformed by it 
(…)’ (Mises 1981, p. 133). ‘Once an exchange ratio 
between money and commodities has been established in 
the market, it continues to exercise an influence beyond the 
period during which it was maintained; it provides the 
basis for the further valuation of money’ (Mises 1981, p. 
130). The money prices of today are linked to those of 
yesterday, and with those of tomorrow and beyond. In 
other words, the past objective exchange value of money 
has a certain significance for its present and future 
valuation. When searching for the objective determinants 
of subjective values of money, we will eventually reach a 
point in time where the object derives its exchange value 
from a value other than money. At this stage of his 
analysis, Mises is undoubtedly turning towards the 
approach proposed by Friedrich von Wieser, who 
attributed a special social and economic significance to the 
‘objective innere Tauchwert des Geldes’ (Taylor 1958). 
Although Wieser, as Mises noted, did not manage to 
develop a complete theory of money, ‘(…) it was Wieser 
who, by revealing the historical element in the purchasing 
power of money, laid the foundation for the further 
development of the subjective theory of the value of 
money’ (Mises 1981, p. 139). 
Let us pause at this point to analyse the essence of 
Mises’ theory of value. Mises himself claimed that he had 
managed to present a complete theory of the value of 
money on the basis of the subjective theory of value and 
its peculiar doctrine of marginal utility (Mises 1981, p. 
136). By introducing the concept of utility into the theory 
of money value, i.e. by assuming that the starting point of 
money valuations is its objective exchange value, Mises 
aligned himself with the school that associated the term 
utility with value. He followed the concept of utility within 
the subjective theory of value introduced by Jevons and 
Walras. Jevons referred the economic question of a 
commodity’s value to its utility. ‘Value depends on the 
utility’ – he wrote in Theory of Political Economy (1871). 
Utility is an abstract quality of a commodity which serves 
human purposes. It is, as Jevons put it, the intensity of the 
effect produced upon the consumer5. Utility must be 
considered as measured by, or even as actually identical 
with, the addition made to a person’s happiness (Jevons 
1931, p. 45). A similar understanding of utility can be 
found in earlier works, including those of J.S. Mill (1806–
1873), J.B. Say (1767–1832) and E.B. de Condillac (1715–
1780)6. Ludwig von Mises followed the approach to value 
understood as the benefit that a good provides – that is, as 
a property of the good. ‘If we wish to estimate the 
significance that a given sum of money has, in view of the 
known dependence upon it of a certain satisfaction, we do 
this only on the assumption that money possesses a given 
objective exchange value’ (Mises 1981, p. 119). Mises 
attributed to money, as a medium of exchange, the concept 
of utility. 
It needs to be pointed out that the concept of utility as 
a measure of value seems inconsistent with Menger’s 
theory of value. In the latter theory there is a significant 
difference between the notions of utility and value. The 
value of a good is related to its economic character (its 
relative scarcity) and the importance of the good in the 
process of satisfaction of a person’s need. For Menger the 
concept of utility   ends     in  the   commodity  attribute.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
5  Utility may be treated as a quantity of two dimensions, one dimension consisting in the quantity of the commodity, and the other in the intensity of the 
effect produced upon the consumer (Jevons 1871/1931, p. 47). 
6  Mill (1848) argued that utility is an inherent property of a good which serves the satisfaction of human need (Zawadzki 1949). In Say’s treatise (1814) 
utility is a quality of a good that makes it desirable for each person (Zawadzki 1949). Condillac (1776) demonstrated that value is based on utility, 
on the need that is satisfied by a commodity or on the benefit (“behoof”) that a good provides (Zawadzki 1949). 
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A good is useful if it satisfies human needs7. A non-
economic good is useful, i.e. able to satisfy human needs, 
but does not have value. Utility is in fact a non-economic 
term. It does not refer to the theory of value, but belongs 
to the theory of good. Since we face scarcity, we rank 
goods according to their importance in the satisfaction of 
needs; that is to say, we attach value to the commodities 
exchanged in the marketplace. We exchange goods 
directly or indirectly, always giving up goods that are less 
valued than those accepted. Money as a medium of 
exchange follows these rules just like other goods. 
As we can see, Mises employed a notion of utility not 
in Menger’s but in Jevons’ sense. By introducing the 
objective exchange value of money, Mises turned to 
marginal utility as a measure of value8. Mises assumed 
that, since money does not meet human needs (as other 
goods do), we cannot assign value to it as we do to other 
goods. ‘When explaining the value of commodities, the 
economist can and must be content to take subjective use 
value for granted and leave investigation of its origins to 
the psychologist (...)’ (Mises 1981, p. 118). It is immaterial 
whether or not the commodity also has exchange value, but 
for money to have use value, the existence of exchange 
value is essential. 
DISCUSSION 
As we have shown, money as a means of exchange was 
considered by Mises not to be subject to the rules of 
valuation introduced by Menger. In making this exception, 
Mises introduced at least three unsolvable problems.  
Firstly, he did not explain how the subjective value of 
money is derived from its objective exchange value. Mises 
stated that the past objective value of money is linked to 
its present and future valuations. The subjective value of 
money is conditioned by its given objective exchange 
value. Both theses fail to explain the nature of the 
subjective exchange value of money. When searching for 
‘objective determinants of money’s subjective value’ we 
do not recognise any factor or process which results in the 
magnitude of its utility. 
Secondly, by introducing into Austrian economics the 
concept of marginal utility, Mises was essentially 
following a blind alley. He assumed that the subjective use 
value of money is measured by the marginal utility of the 
goods for which the money can be exchanged. This 
contradicts his earlier statement on the immeasurability of 
the subjective exchange value of money. ‘So long as the 
subjective value of money is accepted, this question of 
measurement cannot arise’ (Mises 1981, p. 51). ‘Acts of 
valuation are not susceptible to any kind of measurement’ 
(Mises 1981, p. 52). 
The process of measuring requires the use of an objective 
means of measurement, namely a unit ‘fixed in time and 
space’ – a tool which is constant and material; for example 
we measure lengths of fabric in metres or body weight in 
kilogrammes. In valuing goods we do not measure the 
value of goods by money – neither do we measure the 
value of money by goods. Value – as Menger was the first 
to note – belongs to the category of human judgment. It 
cannot be measured or quantified. It is of qualitative 
character. Neither Commodity a nor Commodity b is a 
measure of the value of the good exchanged. ‘In a market, 
exchange will continue until it is no longer possible for the 
reciprocal surrender of commodities by any individuals to 
result in their each acquiring commodities that stand 
higher on their value scales than those surrendered’ (Mises 
1981, p. 53).  
Thirdly, the concept of the marginal utility of money 
assumes the existence of price. According to Mises, it is 
subjective valuations that are the basis for money prices. 
So prices are on the one hand a result of the valuation 
process, and on the other its cause. Although the prices in 
question are not the same ones, the category of price 
cannot be explained in terms of itself. In this context, the 
historical element of continuity in the objective exchange 
value of money, employed by Mises as proof of the 
commodity origin of money, also becomes unclear. It 
appears to depict a functional dependency, which is a 
category of descriptive rather than causal character. 
And last but not least, if we take Mises’ view that ‘the 
subjective use-value of money (…) is nothing but the 
anticipated use-value of things that are to be bought with 
it’ (Mises 1981, p. 130), then we will inevitably accept the 
assumption of the objective theory of value on the 
reciprocal surrender of equivalent goods. Its primary 
implication is that exchange transactions are preceded by 
measurements of the quantity of value contained in each of 
the objects that are to be exchanged. And money as a 
medium of exchange is a measure of value (!). 
 
7  Nützlichkeit ist die Tauglichkeit eines Dinges, der Befriedigung menschlicher Bedürfnisse zu dienen und demnach (und zwar die erkannte Nützlichkeit) 
eine allgemeine Vorraussetzung der Güterqualität. Auch nicht ökonomische Güter sind nützlich, indem dieselben zur Befriedigung unserer 
Bedürfnisse ebenso wohl tauglich sind, als die ökonomischen, und diese Tauglichkeit muss auch bei ihnen eine von den Menschen erkannte sein, 
sonst könnten sie überhaupt nicht die Güterqualität erlagen. Was aber nicht ökonomisches Gut von einem solchen unterscheidet, welches in dem den 
ökonomischen Charakter begründenden Quantitätenverhältnisse steht, das ist der Umstand, dass nicht von der Verfügung über concrete Quantitäten 
des erstern, wohl aber von einer solchen über concrete Quantitäten des letztern die Befriedigung menschlicher Bedürfnisse abhängig ist, und somit 
die ersteren wohl Nützlichkeit, nur die letzteren aber neben ihrer Nützlichkeit auch jene Bedeutung für uns haben, die wir Werth nennen (Menger 
1871/2010, p. 84). 
8  ‘Money utility is the possibility of obtaining a certain quantity of other economic goods in exchange for a given quantity of money. (...) money has no 
utility other than that arising from the possibility of obtaining other goods in exchange for it’ (Mises 1912/1981, p. 118). 
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In his later book Human Action: A Treatise on 
Economics (1949) Ludwig von Mises basically sustains 
the theses introduced in Theory of Money and Credit 
(1912). However, the theory of the value of money was 
presented there slightly differently9. 
The numerous references to the quantity theory of 
money appearing in Chapter XVII, titled Indirect 
Exchange, indicate that as far as money theory is 
concerned, the 1949 work may be regarded as a 
supplementation of the analysis first put forward by Mises 
in 1912. Mises argued, referring among others to the ideas 
of Menger, that ‘the theory of money was and is always 
the theory of indirect exchange and of the media of 
exchange’ (Mises 1949, p. 395). From that assumption he 
derived two important premises. First, money as a medium 
of exchange is an economic good – it is rare and there is a 
demand for it. Second, the subject matter of the theory of 
indirect exchange is the study of exchange ratios between 
the medium of exchange on the one hand and goods and 
services on the other hand. 
In Human Action … (1949) Mises used the so-called 
praxeological method, which, in Mises’ words, ‘traces all 
phenomena back to actions of the individuals’ (Mises 
1949, p. 403). He argued that when analysing monetary 
phenomena we need to take as a point of departure the 
value judgments of the people concerned. The method 
applied by Mises led him to two important conclusions. 
First, ‘(…) the appraisement of money is to be explained 
in the same way as the appraisement of all other goods: by 
the demand on the part of those who are eager to acquire a 
definite quantity of it’ (Mises 1949, p. 400). Second, ‘(…) 
it would still be faulty to explain the purchasing power – 
the price – of the monetary unit on the basis of its services’ 
(Mises 1949, p. 396). (…) It is always demand that 
influences the price structure, not the objective value in use 
(Mises 1949, p. 397). Having in mind Mises’ theory from 
1912, one can see that these statements contradict the 
theses presented there. In spite of this, Mises does not 
revise his theory. Instead, he returns to his regression 
theorem, arguing that ‘the demand for a medium of 
exchange (…) depends on its value in exchange’ (Mises 
1949, p. 405). 
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